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Important strategic, moral, safety and environmental outcomes hinge on Australia’s decision 
whether to sell uranium to India. In its final days, the Howard Government decided to sell. 
Following Labor’s win, Foreign Minister Stephen Smith reversed that decision and declared 
Australia would not sell.1 But, somewhat confusingly, Canberra also decided not to oppose 
the Indo-US nuclear deal in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG). 
Until recently, the issue was academic. A successful conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal 
was necessary for the sale of Australian uranium to India. But India’s Congress-led 
government, dependent on communist and other left-leaning votes in the Indian parliament, 
was floundering in its attempts to obtain political support for the deal. Then, in July 2008, the 
political logjam was broken when the Manmohan Singh Government split with the leftists, 
teamed up with another minority party, the Samajwadi Party, and won a confidence vote in 
the Indian lower house. Since then, India has managed to strike a safeguards deal with the 
IAEA. After protracted negotiations, it now appears that the 45-member NSG has also 
endorsed the deal. Final clearance is still needed in the US Congress and timing is tight, with 
impending US and Indian elections. But prospects for the deal look brighter than they have 
for some time, and the matter of the sale of uranium to India is now very much back in 
Canberra’s in-tray.  
This paper argues in favour of the sale of Australian uranium to India. But it also emphasises 
that Australia should participate only in the context of highly conditional outcomes in terms of 
the long negotiation process now underway involving the United States, India, the IAEA and 
the NSG. And Canberra should be especially aware of the important strategic issues around 
the edges of the deal, particularly in relation to a perception in some quarters in Washington 
that China should be contained and that the deal is part of that process. 
In reaching this conclusion, the paper examines the issue of India’s industrial growth and its 
contribution to climate change, whether the deal would protect Australian uranium from 
misuse, whether it would have any counter-proliferation effects in terms of India’s nuclear 
weapons strategy and the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, finally, 
the strategic implications of the deal in terms of India’s rise as an Asian power. 
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India’s energy needs and global warming 
One of the most powerful issues brought to bear on the argument relates to India’s future as 
a substantial emitter of greenhouse gasses. But before the protagonists of the debate over 
the sale of uranium even lock horns, they must consider difficult technical issues surrounding 
the utility of nuclear energy in alleviating greenhouse effects.  
One side in this debate maintains that the greenhouse benefits of nuclear energy are 
doubtful. They contend that greenhouse costs associated with mining, construction, de-
commissioning and waste disposal outweigh any greenhouse benefits. They maintain that 
the track record of the nuclear power industry shows that it has struggled to prove 
economic.2 Others, however, maintain that there are substantial greenhouse net benefits to 
be derived from nuclear energy. They claim that, given new efficiencies in the design of 
nuclear power plants and potential pricing of carbon emissions, the industry will prove 
economic in the future.3 
This paper assumes, for the sake of argument, that there are net benefits from nuclear power 
in terms of greenhouse reduction—especially in the case of Australia-sourced uranium, 
which is relatively easy to extract, and also given the increasing global reliance on coal for 
production of base load electricity. It also assumes that nuclear energy is competitive in 
relation to the provision of base load in respect of renewable sources of energy, or at least in 
terms of currently available technology. But, if either of these assumptions were proved 
wrong, or were to become inaccurate due to future developments, there would be no case for 
selling uranium to India, or anywhere else for that matter. Crucially, the assumptions in this 
paper actually depend on a decision by Australia to mine and sell uranium widely, in order to 
ensure that easily extractable resources are available.  
* * * 
The Indian population is expected to have outstripped that of China by 2030. It will eventually 
reach stasis at about 1.6 billion people. The economy is now growing at between 8–9 
per cent. India is energy poor given this enormous population and rapid economic 
development. 
India has 17 per cent of the global population, yet consumes only 4 per cent of its energy. 
But development from a low base implies energy intensive growth and India is likely to 
emerge as a major greenhouse gas contributor. In the decade to 2002, for example, India’s 
greenhouse emissions rose by 57 per cent compared to China’s 33 per cent. The Energy 
and Resources Institute estimates that to sustain a ‘business as usual’ scenario (an 
estimated growth rate of 8 per cent per annum and the current approach to the energy mix), 
India would need to quadruple coal consumption by 2031 to 1200 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent.4 The Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission estimates that if India 
cannot import fuel or reactors under the Indo-US nuclear deal, it will have to burn 1.6 billion 
tonnes of imported coal per year by 2050.5 
India is energy poor in terms of liquid fuels. India’s energy mix is 30 per cent dependent on 
oil, but it supplies only 34 per cent of its own crude. It has discovered substantial gas fields 
off the east coast, but these are located in deep water and will take some years to develop. 
India has substantial supplies of coal, but the quality is poor with high sulphur content. The 
location is also distant from major demand centres and troubled by a Maoist insurgency, 
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which limits investment potential. The industry—mainly controlled by government-owned 
Coal India—is outmoded. More importantly, even if India were able to extract sufficient coal 
to meet its energy needs, this would constitute a massive contribution to greenhouse gasses, 
with global ramifications.  
Nuclear energy is one of a mix of solutions through which India and China may be able to 
generate the enormous amounts of energy their growth will entail without undue production 




India’s civil and military nuclear programs and doctrine 
The civil program 
India has only 1 per cent of the world’s discovered uranium, but 32 per cent of its thorium. It 
is consequently seeking to configure its civil nuclear program with thorium in mind. But this 
will take many years to realise even if it can eventually be achieved (which is highly 
questionable).  
Meanwhile, India is seeking to expand its generating capacity from the current 3.8 per cent 
nuclear power to 25 per cent nuclear power by 2050—an ambitious program that will 
demand considerable supplies of imported uranium or successful completion of the thorium 
fuel cycle program. Australia, with 40 per cent of the world’s easily recoverable uranium, is a 
natural source to which it will turn.  
The three-stage thorium cycle begins with pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) 
fuelled by natural uranium, which produce plutonium. Fast breeder reactors (FBRs) then use 
the plutonium in an oxide fuel to breed U-233. The ‘advanced’ PHWRs then burn the U-233 
with thorium, thereby obtaining 75 per cent of their power from the thorium and also providing 
a safer proliferation regime. 
India’s FBR program is ostensibly civil, but potentially has a fuel cycle in common with the 
military program. Both require plutonium separated at reprocessing facilities, while the FBR 
also produces Pu-239, which is suitable for a bomb. 
The military program 
For many years, India has argued that the dual system operating under the NPT is unfair, 
flawed and hypocritical. At base, India is requesting from the United States under the 
proposed deal something very close to the status enjoyed under the NPT by the so-called 
Nuclear Five (N5)—the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and China. New 
Delhi maintains that India has a deep need for the security offered by nuclear weapons, 
focusing on Pakistan and China. India further argues that, despite its refusal to sign the NPT, 
its performance on ‘horizontal’ proliferation has been better than that of China. 
There is some truth in this claim. Although India has dissembled through a series of shell 
companies in order to obtain certain dual use technologies, including from the United States, 
there is no evidence that it has ever transferred nuclear weapons-related technology to a 
third country. Unlike India, there is strong evidence that China has done so.6  
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As shall be discussed, the fact that India is an embittered, revisionist power in respect of the 
NPT continues strongly to influence its strategic positioning and attitude to vertical 
proliferation.  
In contrast to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which primarily depends on highly 
enriched uranium, India’s program mainly uses plutonium from two ‘research’ reactors and 
possibly some commercial reactors.7  
In 2005, David Albright estimated that, at the end of 2004, India had enough plutonium for 
65–110 weapons, or a median of 85 weapons equivalent. Today, this would represent a 
median of 90 weapons.8 Desmond Ball puts the figure at 120–125.9 Writing in 2006, Ashley 
Tellis put the figure at 65–91 weapons equivalent of fissionable material.10  
India is likely to have two units of Prithvi short-range ballistic missiles weaponised with 
perhaps a dozen weapons, capable of hitting parts of Pakistan. Other weapons would be 
ready for delivery by India’s fighter-bombers. The Agni, India’s intermediate-range ballistic 
missile, may also be weaponised. India is working on a 5000 kilometre range version of the 
Agni, known as Agni III. This will be independently targeted and, in three or four years, is 
likely to be weaponised and capable of reaching most of China, including Beijing. 
India has publicly expressed its nuclear doctrine in two documents, the first issued in 1999 
and the second in January 2003. The doctrine calls for ‘no first use’, combined with what is 
referred to as ‘minimum credible nuclear deterrence’ (the word ‘minimum’ has recently been 
omitted). This combination implies that, after receiving a nuclear strike that could knock out 
some of its nuclear weapons, India would have enough warheads for a punishing retaliation 
against combined Pakistani and Chinese nuclear forces. It also implies survivability. India 
sees this, in turn, as necessitating a so-called nuclear ‘triad’—that is, nuclear weapons to be 
delivered by missile, aircraft and submarine, with redundancy in command and survivable 
C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) systems. 
India has not defined the number of warheads that would constitute ‘credible deterrence’, but 
sees the doctrine as ‘dynamic’, depending on strategic circumstances at the time, especially 
in relation to China’s development and modernisation of its arsenal and delivery systems and 
the political situation between India and China.  
India’s position on nuclear weapons is shared between the country’s two major political 
groupings and is unlikely to be rolled back. Indeed, India is likely to proceed with some kind 
of submarine delivery capability—whether this will be a submarine-launched ballistic missile 
or a cruise missile remains unclear. India is also developing its own nuclear-powered 
submarine, known as the Advanced Technology Vessel.  
The 2003 document announced a nuclear control structure that places control firmly in the 
hands of civilians. The Nuclear Command Authority consists of two committees—a political 
committee headed by the Prime Minister and a technical council involving the defence chiefs 
and military bureaucrats. Actual forces are under a Strategic Forces Command, currently 
headed by an Air Vice Marshal. Physical control of the arsenal has been given to the Indian 
Army. 
From the point of view of this paper and the debate on sale of uranium to India, there are 
important lessons to be learned from this brief examination of the Indian program. First, there 
is a very close link between the civil and military programs—a link derived from the 
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autonomous nature of the development of nuclear sciences in India and the plutonium base 
of India’s weapons. Second, India’s nuclear weapons posture is deeply held, bipartisan, and 
based on a firm belief that the NPT regime has been most unfair in its strategic effect on 
India. India is the only emerging world power that is not a member of the N5 and this makes 
it something of a special case. As discussed below, this is a very important factor in the 
debate over how to deal with India’s nuclear weapons program. Third, India has generally 
been somewhat restrained as a nuclear power and, as far as is known, has not shared its 
nuclear technology with any other power. Rather, its program has only entailed vertical 
proliferation and even that has been conducted at a moderate pace. These features 
differentiate the Indian program from those of other NPT and non-NPT players such as China 
and Pakistan.  
 
 
The Indo-US nuclear deal and the potential role of Australian 
uranium 
The Indo-US deal is crucial for the sale of Australian uranium to India. Not only must the deal 
proceed, along with subsequent deals with the NSG and IAEA, but these arrangements 
together must also be of a quality to protect Australian uranium from possible direct use in 
the weapons program. In short, no deal, no sale.  
Ideally, the arrangements should also force at least some level of restraint on India and 
achieve better nuclear safety outcomes. Potential greenhouse emission reduction benefits 
have already been discussed.  
And, finally, any benefits should not be outweighed by any damage the deal and concomitant 
sale of Australian uranium might do to the NPT regime. This last point will be dealt with in a 
later section of the paper on strategic issues.  
The original nuclear deal between the United States and India, negotiated in 2005 and 2006, 
was little more than a loose political agreement. Unfortunately the devil proved to be in the 
detail.  
The original deal involved India separating 14 reactors of its 22 facilities, reserving them for 
civil nuclear use and placing them under safeguards, to be agreed with the IAEA. The 14 
reactors on the civil list do not include India’s FBR, which requires plutonium from the 
reprocessing facilities and produces plutonium capable of use in a nuclear weapon. The 
Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, which had been a critical component of the weapons 
program because of its supply of plutonium, was to be decommissioned by 2010 and 
possibly replaced with an indigenous, non-safeguarded, research reactor. For its part, the 
United States agreed to ‘facilitate’ agreement within the NSG that members would agree to 
allow nuclear trade with India.  
As discussions between India and the United States proceeded, two major sticking points 
emerged. First, the United States refused to amend or override section 123 of the 1954 
Atomic Energy Act to remove the stipulation that any Indian test would result in the return of 
all US-supplied materials. According to India, the US position contradicted the clause in the 
original deal that guaranteed lifetime supplies of fuel for foreign-supplied reactors.  
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Secondly, the United States demanded an end to Indian re-processing. Since India’s 
weapons program is predominantly plutonium based, this was tantamount to a severe limit 
on production of fissionable material, if not an actual cut-off. New Delhi also saw it as a 
limitation on the nature of the civil nuclear program, which required plutonium for the FBRs. 
Given India’s concerns about a proliferating China and its argument that reprocessing was 
intrinsic to the Indian nuclear model, New Delhi was not prepared to concede on this point.  
Eventually a compromise was reached allowing India to erect a separate re-processing 
facility to handle ‘foreign’ nuclear material in a cut-off loop that effectively separated such 
material from the military program. The issue of testing was also addressed by allowing 
India, with US support and assistance from other nuclear supplier nations, to build up 
strategic stockpiles of material sufficient to allow the continuing operation of civil nuclear 
plants even should the United States demand repatriation of its material following a test. 
Moreover, the new text stipulates simply that the two sides would consult following any 
alleged breach, rather than that India would suffer a mandatory repatriation of US material.11 
These new provisions amounted to significant concessions on the part of the United States. 
Nevertheless, in India, the Singh Government was caught between the rock of the hawkish 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the hard place of its then communist and leftist allies, who 
did not want any nuclear deal with the United States. Although a parliamentary vote was not 
a mandatory requirement, the minority Singh Government was subject to the leftists bringing 
it down on other issues. However, Singh eventually solved this problem by breaking with the 
leftists, forming an alliance with the Samajwadi Party, and subsequently winning a 
confidence vote in the Indian lower house, the Lok Sabha.  
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Hyde Act—the Act of the US 
Congress allowing the deal to proceed at all—apparently contradicts the finalised version of 
the 123 Agreement by asserting a tougher US position on a number of matters, including the 
return of materials following any Indian test. The position stated in the Hyde Act is 
unacceptable to India, so the issue arises: which document has precedence, the Hyde Act or 
the 123 Agreement? Under the Geneva Conventions, the 123 Agreement (as an international 
treaty) apparently has precedence, but the situation is not at all clear and may need testing in 
the US courts.  
Moreover, the Singh Government faces a national election in May 2009. Given current high 
inflation in India, there is a reasonable prospect that the government will not be returned. 
Should a BJP-led government emerge, it would be unlikely to renege on any deal finalised in 
the interim period. That is not the case, however, should a left-leaning alliance be victorious. 
Thus, notwithstanding recent progress with the deal, the long-term outcome is still uncertain. 
* * * 
In terms of the criteria for an Australian sale mentioned above (protection of Australian 
material and some restraint on India), how does the latest iteration of the Indo-US agreement 
stand up? 
In the matter of protection, on the surface it would appear that any Australian material would 
be protected from direct use in the nuclear weapons program. Such material would only be 
used in the protected reactors and reprocessed in the protected reprocessing plant. An audit 
and inspection regime would be in place, as recently agreed between India and the IAEA. 
Thus, in a direct sense, Australian uranium would not be used in the weapons program.  
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Numerous commentators (including this author) have argued, however, that any uranium 
supplied to India would be ‘fungible’ between the two programs.12 They argue this on the 
grounds that any foreign supplied uranium, even if confined to protected reactors, would 
effectively free up India’s limited indigenous uranium supplies for use in the military program.  
It should also be noted that uranium could be fungible in the international as well as the 
Indian national context. Should Australia provide world markets with large quantities of 
uranium, which it will, then that would free up other recipients of this uranium, such as the 
United States, France, Russia and even China, to provide their uranium to India—which they 
could do quite legitimately under the decision of the NSG, which in turn hinges on the 123 
and IAEA Agreements. In this sense, Australia’s decision not to sell to India will have little 
material effect on India’s access to uranium, so long as India is accorded access to world 
markets and Australia continues to sell into those markets. 
These arguments about fungibility have been countered in two ways. First, one commentator 
asserts that the argument effectively applies to any energy supplied to India, whether coal, 
gas, oil or uranium, in that all such supplies effectively take pressure off India’s indigenous 
uranium.13 This argument fails to account for the fact that India, and the world, require a 
‘clean’ energy regime to fuel India’s industrial rise. Nuclear energy fuelled by uranium is one 
means of meeting this criterion.  
A second argument against the ‘fungibility’ thesis has been made by Ashley Tellis. According 
to Tellis, India can afford to pursue both its civil nuclear program and military program without 
unduly taxing its domestic uranium supplies, at least for several decades. Tellis maintains 
that this is because India has pursued its weapons program with overall restraint. He backs 
up this argument with a detailed assessment of consumption scenarios against availability.14 
If one accepts Tellis’ position on fungibility, then there is little evidence that Australia’s 
uranium would assist the military program, at least in the short-term. Tellis’ view is, however, 
challenged, including by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who asserts that 
the PHWR program will stall if uranium and reactors cannot be imported to support an 
accelerated three-stage program and India will consequently suffer a severe ‘energy gap’.15 
But, in addition, one of the criteria for the sale of Australian uranium should be a requirement 
that the 123 Agreement limit India’s nuclear weapons production capability or modify its 
nuclear posture for the better. As well, the Agreement should improve the nuclear safety 
regime in India. 
Those opposed to the deal outside India argue that it does not limit India’s weapons capacity, 
and actually enhances it.16 Ironically, this is the exact opposite of the arguments used by the 
broadly described ‘right’ within India. Some of India’s leading nuclear scientists and strategic 
commentators, as well as the BJP, are opposed to the deal precisely on the grounds that it 
would limit India’s future nuclear weapons development capacity. Their arguments touch 
upon India’s right to test under the deal, the need of India to establish a separate 
reprocessing facility for civil nuclear material and the potential limitation this places on India’s 
production of fissionable material.17 While these views have been contested,18 they go to the 
heart of a debate in India that nearly unseated the current government.  
Probably the issue is at the margin: that is, the deal would not make all that much difference 
to India’s weapons capacity. According to Tellis, it is ‘universally’ agreed that the two 
research reactors, CIRUS and Dhruva, were the principal means of production of India’s 
fissionable material up to the time of the 1998 tests.19 Tellis asserts that, after the tests, some 
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of the other reactors may have been used in a speeded-up program at ‘low burnup’ modes.20 
If this were true, and if some of the 14 reactors designated for the civil nuclear program 
under the Indo-US deal were involved, then this would imply that the deal places at least 
some limitation on India’s capacity. But if Tellis is correct, this limitation is minimal and would 
be offset by the construction of a new, larger research reactor to replace CIRUS.  
However, in certain circumstances, the deal could have major implications for any future 
production of fissionable material. This would occur should relations between India and 
China sharply deteriorate to the extent that India felt constrained greatly to expand its nuclear 
weapons program to counter a resurgent and, in India’s view, threatening China. Were it not 
for the deal, in such circumstances those reactors designated ‘civil’ would likely be coopted 
for production of plutonium for the weapons program. Those opposed to the deal may argue, 
however, that, in such dire circumstances, India would be tempted to ‘tear up’ the deal in any 
case.  
Also, the deal does place some limitation on India’s capacity to test. An India more fully 
integrated into the world civil nuclear program would have at least some incentive not to test, 
because at least some of its nuclear trading partners would likely refuse trade following a 
test. The inability to test, however, would only be a serious setback to India if its 
thermonuclear tests of 1998 were unsuccessful, as many believe to have been the case. But 
again, the incentive on India to test would very much depend on the circumstances at the 
time, and especially the level of perceived threat from China.21 
Be that as it may, the deal at least has the effect of limiting and constraining the Indian 
program in the formal sense. In that regard, it can be argued that it helps to reinforce 
normative values that support nuclear restraint. As argued below, it could also act as a circuit 
breaker in helping to stabilise vertical nuclear proliferation in Asia, especially in relation to 
testing and fissionable material cut-off.  
One definite advantage of the deal is that it would greatly improve the safety regime within 
the civil nuclear program by linking India’s hitherto autarchic program to world safety best 
practice. Given that India will persist with and expand its program with or without the deal, 
this is a very important consideration. Because of India’s high population density, many 
reactors are located near populated areas. Even those not so located are sited in agricultural 
areas—areas that could be extensively contaminated during an accident. Although no Indian 
reactor has experienced a catastrophic accident, there have been numerous incidents, some 
involving injury to workers.  
Another important outcome of the deal is that, over time, it could result in India being weaned 
away from its difficult, costly and dangerous three-phase nuclear program involving FBRs 
and advanced PHWRs. This would occur should India become confident that it would have 
assured supplies of relatively cheap natural uranium, including from Australia. Of course, 
nobody in the Indian nuclear establishment would yet admit to that possibility.  
The above focus on the Indo-US deal suggests that it would likely protect Australian uranium 
from misuse and have at least some benefit in terms of vertical proliferation and safety. But 
how would the arrangements likely affect strategic relationships in the region? And how 
would they impact on vertical and horizontal proliferation and the future of the NPT?  
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Strategic considerations and the NPT 
The Indo-US deal is being negotiated during a time of flux in Asian security. China and India 
are steadily accruing power. Russia is attempting to re-assert some of the influence enjoyed 
by the former Soviet Union. After a long post-war interregnum, Japan is again adopting a 
more assertive position. Meanwhile, the US role in Asia has been overshadowed by its 
involvement in wars in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.  
As a big, potentially powerful player, India is relatively new on this scene. The Central 
Intelligence Agency therefore refers to it as a ‘swing’ state in Asia:22 that is, how India 
chooses to slot into the unstable environment could have an effect on the security 
architecture that eventually develops in the region.  
Against this background, the United States has offered India what US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice has called a ‘broad strategic’ relationship.23 The Indo-US nuclear deal 
evolved directly out of this offer and is integral to it.  
What is Washington’s motive for this major strategic move? Is it, as the conservative think 
tank the Heritage Foundation suggests, that the deal is part of a necessary move to balance 
the rise of a ‘less predictable’ power, namely China?24 Is it simply an attempt by a discredited 
administration to pull some chestnuts out of the ashes of a failed foreign policy? Does it 
result from commercial pressures to get back into a re-vitalised nuclear market? Does it 
relate to concerns about climate change? Or is it a positive attempt to stabilise a potentially 
difficult nuclear equation in Asia by bringing India in from the nuclear cold and giving it an 
incentive to work with other Asian powers on nuclear security? 
Probably each of these motives is to an extent in play. Certainly some in the US 
Administration, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, seem keen to balance and contain a 
rising China. Recently, he reportedly supported involving India in the ‘trilateral’ strategic 
dialogue process between the United States, Australia and Japan so as to create a so-called 
‘quadrilateral’.25  
From Canberra’s viewpoint, the Cheney approach is likely to be unwelcome.26 A policy of 
containment of China may force Australia at some stage to choose between China and the 
United States, or China and India. It could cut directly across Australia’s commercial interests 
in supplying commodities to a booming Asia, especially China. Australia would obviously 
prefer an Asia of open markets, rising mutual confidence and a peaceful rise for China than a 
premature policy of containment. 
A ‘quadrilateral’ arrangement apparently aimed at containing China would also trump any 
prospect of Asia developing a ‘concert of powers’ amongst the large players in Asia, to use 
Coral Bell’s term.27  
The Indo-US deal could arguably therefore be a negative step in Asia’s security. In 
combination with the ‘quadrilateral’ proposal, it could be interpreted as an attempt to induct 
India into the US security sphere. Certainly, China seems initially to have opposed it on that 
basis.  
Canberra therefore has a strong incentive to develop Australia’s bilateral relationship with 
India in a way that balances Australia’s strategic need to ensure that India ‘inserts itself into 
the Asian power equation’ in a constructive way. This could prove difficult, given the 
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preferences of some within the Bush Administration and Australia’s limited traction as a 
middle power—one moreover that sometimes appears in New Delhi as a ‘pale shadow’ of 
the United States and its policies. However, a new administration in Washington—whether 
Democrat or Republican—is likely to be more accommodating to China.  
One way of helping to achieve a more dynamic bilateral relationship with India—a 
relationship not overly focused on the military and ‘quadrilateral’ type arrangements—would 
be to encourage a deepening trading relationship. Such an approach would be similar to the 
one adopted first with Japan, then China, as those two countries emerged as the industrial 
power-houses of Asia. The export of commodities, and especially energy-related 
commodities, would be an important aspect of such a relationship.  
In this regard, India is hungry for the export of Australian uranium. Should the respective 
deals with the United States, the IAEA and NSG proceed, New Delhi would expect export to 
take place, especially given Australia’s decision to export to China—a decision which India 
regards as having a far worse track record on horizontal proliferation. If Canberra were to 
refuse, it would damage the bilateral relationship for a limited period.  
Seen in this light, the sale of uranium to India by Australia fits with a basic Asian strategy of 
deepening mutual trading relationships. But, on the other hand, it can also be argued that it 
opens out the possibility of a more antagonistic relationship between India and China 
because it strategically enhances the Indo-US relationship and also, according to some, 
encourages and supports India’s nuclear weapons aspirations.  
Right now, India is ambivalent about China. On one level, it benefits from increasingly vibrant 
trade and people-to-people relationships with China. On another level, it is deeply suspicious 
of China’s growing footprint in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi considers this region to be 
India’s ‘backyard’. China has embarked on a series of economic and quasi-strategic 
relationships with South Asian and Indian Ocean countries. It is energetically competing with 
India in the hunt for energy around the periphery of the Indian Ocean region. But the claims 
of some Indian observers of a ‘string of pearls’ of Chinese ‘bases’ stretching from the South 
China Sea to the Persian Gulf, which it believes are designed to ‘surround’ India, are 
exaggerated.28  
Also on the negative side of the ledger, India sees China as its most significant nuclear 
competitor and reserves the right to define ‘minimum deterrence’ in the context of China’s 
strategic arsenal and posture at any particular time.  
China, however, sees its principal nuclear competitor as the United States, with its much 
more powerful capability. Similarly, should India seek significant new nuclear capabilities, so 
too might the far less stable Pakistan. Overall, this is potentially a highly unstable nuclear 
equation. And the issue remains as to how the Indo-US deal will feed into it—positively or 
negatively. 
While the deal is being negotiated between India and the United States, it would also open 
out the possibility of commercial nuclear relationships with a wide range of countries, 
including Russia and China. This type of relationship would offer the long-term prospect of 
developing mutual trust in the nuclear sphere rather than secrecy and distrust. The deal 
would also go some way to removing India’s anxiety about energy supplies, including in 
relation to its energy competition with China.  
Implications of the Sale of Australian Uranium to India 
Sandy Gordon 
© 2008 The Australian National University 
11
In other ways too the deal should be seen as a first step in inducting India into a much wider 
regime intended to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. By 
bringing India into the nuclear ‘club’, the deal would give New Delhi a far stronger incentive to 
support a more stable counter-proliferation regime in Asia. India would be less likely to play 
the destabilising, spoiler role of an embittered revisionist in respect of the NPT. Thereby, 
many other possibilities would start to fall into place. A much more hopeful scenario in terms 
of India eventually acceding to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreeing to 
fissionable material cut-off could then be developed.  
The introduction of a viable fissionable cut-off regime would be one of the single most 
important steps in ensuring a more stable proliferation regime in the Asia-Pacific region, 
since it would limit any potential nuclear weapons race between China and the United States, 
China and India and India and Pakistan. Minimisation of vertical proliferation would be an 
important element in limiting horizontal proliferation, since horizontal proliferation feeds from 
and is stimulated by vertical proliferation.  
Ironically, it is the United States rather than India which is currently preventing a formal cut-
off regime. Washington has refused to open US facilities to the type of inspections that would 
be needed to monitor a cut-off regime. 
A new administration in Washington in 2009 may be more inclined to support a cut-off regime 
than the present Bush Administration. If the United States does come on board with cut-off, 
there is some prospect that both India and China could be induced to participate. If India 
remains outside the NPT regime, there is significantly less prospect of cut-off being 
achieved. Even if the United States does not formally adhere to cut-off, the deal would open 
the prospect that India might join the N5 in declaratory, but un-verified, cut-off policies.  
While the deal would not, in itself, prevent India conducting further nuclear tests, it would 
provide a significant incentive in that direction. Should India again test, US collaboration 
would be withdrawn under the US Atomic Energy Act. Australia would also doubtless cease 
uranium supplies, should it have decided to sell to India by that time. Other Western 
suppliers would also likely re-consider their positions. 
Although recent negotiations seek to mitigate this effect, from India’s point of view, by 
allowing the formation of fuel and other stockpiles, an India inducted into a global regime and 
benefiting from that regime would certainly have pause for consideration of a further test.  
Stabilisation of the regional nuclear competition is also a vital pre-condition for the creation of 
the kind of stable regional security architecture discussed above. Containment and a Cold 
War-like atmosphere would be hard to avoid in circumstances of nuclear instability in the 
region.  
Both India and China are crucial here. If China seeks rapidly to develop and modernise its 
arsenal, India’s view of minimum deterrence will not be a stable one. If China feels the United 
States is establishing a system of containment against it in Asia, it will be far more inclined to 
continue with its vertical proliferation.  
This is where it becomes absolutely vital to ensure that, while supporting the US-India 
nuclear deal, Australia also seeks to limit prospects that the United States and its friends 
inadvertently and prematurely drift into a policy of containment of China. In this regard, 
Canberra’s caution to date about the development of a ‘quadrilateral’ is commendable.  
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But what are the wider implications of the deal in terms of the future of the NPT? Many 
opponents of the deal argue that a policy of exception cannot be the basis for a successful 
NPT.29 If it can be shown that the NPT would be seriously undermined by the deal, with a 
resultant ‘nuclear breakout’ in the region, any gains from the deal would surely be negated. 
The argument that the deal would cause further horizontal proliferation in the region does not 
appear to accord with the facts. What occurs in India has very little bearing on policies in, 
say, Iran. Tehran’s apparent nuclear weapons ambitions are driven far more by perceived 
security concerns about the nuclear United States and Israel than about India. Ironically, Iran 
itself is still a NPT signatory power.  
Even North Korea commenced its proliferation initiative as a signatory, as did Libya. Neither 
of these countries gave up their nuclear ambitions because of the NPT, but rather as a result 
of other pressures and factors.  
Both India and Pakistan ‘went nuclear’ because of security concerns and were not prevented 
from doing so by the NPT. Indeed, it can be argued in respect of India that the NPT was a 
‘red rag to a bull’ in that China, later to become a member of the N5, had attacked India and 
exported nuclear technology to Pakistan.  
It could also be argued that an India ‘inside the tent’ would be more useful for the future of 
the NPT than an embittered India attacking the regime from outside. And it could even be 
argued that the Indian precedent could, over the long term, work to strengthen the NPT by 
providing a model through which other dissident nations, such as Pakistan, might eventually 
be brought into a more protected environment—one that would minimise the possibility of the 
extremely damaging proliferation caused by the Abdul Qadeer Khan network. Obviously, 
Pakistan would need to cross some significant nuclear governance and general governance 
hurdles before any such move could be contemplated. But the possibility that it might one 
day become worthy of induction should be held out by way of encouragement.  
So we are left with a nuclear deal that could pan out either way, depending on what occurs 
around the edges. On the one hand, it could be a profoundly positive development in 
opening India up to participation in moves to stabilise the nuclear equation in Asia, if not an 
actual ‘circuit breaker’. But on the other hand, if rhetoric and actions around the edge of the 
deal are such that they are misinterpreted in Beijing, we could be left with a less stable 
situation in an Asia in which newly powerful states are jockeying for position and power, and 




The argument in this paper in favour of Australia exporting uranium to India is highly 
conditional. It depends firstly on workable arrangements between India and the United 
States, India and the IAEA, India and the NSG, and India and Australia. It hinges on the 
prospect that India can be gradually drawn into a more comprehensive regime that involves 
the eventual stabilisation of an otherwise intrinsically unstable nuclear equation in Asia. In 
this, it views the deal and related arrangements as a potentially positive force in terms of 
developing a more viable regime in Asia. Above all, it depends on concurrent work to 
stabilise and neutralise the inherently dangerous regional tendency to contain and isolate 
China. In this, Australia and India would need to work together to retain a sceptical position 
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against any more forthright demands of Japan and the United States to militarise the sets of 
relationships in the region.  
A further point, often overlooked by critics of the proposed sale, is that the Indo-US deal and 
the arrangements surrounding it are likely to prove very important in establishing a better 
Indian safety regime. If properly managed, the arrangements could provide the means to 
wean India away from its difficult, potentially dangerous and certainly costly three-phased 
nuclear program towards a more practical program that would depend on secure and 
relatively cheap supplies of natural uranium to be burned in third and fourth generation 
reactors.  
And finally, although nuclear power will not, in itself, be a panacea for greenhouse gas 
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